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Bernstein v. United States Department of Justice:        
A Cryptic Interpretation of Speech 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of speech is essential to the preservation of free institu-
tions and individual dignity. Without the debate inherent in a liberal 
society, power coalesces around uncontested leadership, demagogu-
ery replaces persuasion, and coercion supplants free exercise of con-
science. The mere threat of such events engenders zealous protection 
of free speech in America. Even after 230 years, modern Americans 
have not forgotten the outrage kindled by the Stamp Act’s clumsy 
suppression of speech.1 Nevertheless, despite fervent protection of 
speech, even the most ardent advocate will concede the need for lim-
its on activity protected under the First Amendment. 
Certainly civilized society cannot endure the gamut of human ac-
tivity and still retain a healthy balance between order and freedom. If 
all behavior were protected speech, the resulting anarchy would in-
evitably destroy society and the protections it affords individuals. At 
a rudimentary level, only that activity which is genuinely expressive 
and does not violate others’ protected rights qualifies for free speech 
protection. Successful protection of speech must balance the coexis-
tent and interdependent needs for order and freedom. If a standard 
of speech protection is overly burdensome (as was the Stamp Act), 
then individuals suffer and may react violently. If a standard of 
speech is overly concerned with freedom, then freedom itself is in 
peril to the degree it is dependent on an ordered society. Determin-
ing the proper balance between social order and individual freedom 
is not a precise science, especially in a rapidly changing society. 
Recent technological advances have forced society to reevaluate 
its standard of free speech. Among the many changes it has brought 
to society, the computer revolution has compelled the courts to de-
 
 1. See CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 95-98 (1944). The Stamp Act, among other things, regulated speech by requiring a 
stamp on several types of papers and documents, including licenses to practice law, newspapers, 
and other circulating publications. The lawyers and publishers, each of whom made their living 
by the spoken and written word, were instrumental in rallying opposition to the Act. See id. 
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termine whether or not encryption source code qualifies for First 
Amendment free speech protection. An encryption program is a 
computer program capable of scrambling and deciphering informa-
tion. Computer operators using the same encryption program can 
prevent unintended parties from accessing sensitive information. As 
with other computer programs, encryption programs are written in 
source code, using computer languages such as C+ or Cobalt. A 
program’s source code must be “compiled” or translated into object 
code, a series of ones and zeroes, before it can actually operate a 
computer. 
A determination that encryption source code is or is not pro-
tected speech involves complex policy decisions in a burgeoning 
computer culture and forces us to ascertain how the first principles of 
free speech will best be furthered. In the pivotal case Bernstein v. 
United States Department of Justice,2 the Ninth Circuit decided that 
encryption source code is protected free speech. This Note will focus 
on why encryption source code is not speech within the purview of 
the First Amendment and will advance a test distinguishing activity 
that is primarily expressive from activity that is primarily functional.3 
This test would protect only activity that is primarily expressive. Part 
II.A explores the major purposes of free speech protection, Part II.B 
reviews relevant Supreme Court precedent defining the contours of 
free speech protection, and Part II.C presents pre-Bernstein cases 
dealing with speech protection for encryption source code. Part III 
presents the facts and reasoning of the principal case. Part IV argues 
that the Bernstein decision is inconsistent with established free 
speech precedent and that a test distinguishing unprotected func-
tional activity from protected expressive activity is more consonant 
with previous Supreme Court decisions and the underlying purposes 
of free speech. 
 
 2. 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 3. In addition to making the determination that encryption source code was speech, 
the Bernstein court addressed several other issues, including: whether the government had le-
gitimate interests in imposing licensing restrictions on the export of encryption technology; 
whether the licensing scheme was overly-broad in its application; and whether the licensing 
scheme could withstand a facial challenge. See id. The only issue this Note addresses is whether 
the court properly determined that encryption source code was speech. Other issues addressed 
by the court are beyond the scope of this Note. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Purposes of Free Speech 
This Note is not intended to be a comprehensive authority on 
the multitudinous theories detailing the purposes of free speech. 
However, a general understanding of a major dichotomy in free 
speech theory will be useful in evaluating the benefits of the func-
tional/expressive test advocated in this Note. 
In academic circles, each free speech scholar seems to have his 
own categorization of free speech theory and theorists. For example, 
D.F.B. Tucker has identified two major groupings: (1) the “Func-
tionalist Liberal Theories” which include the “Utilitarian Functional-
ism” theory (which includes theorists John Stuart Mill and Justice 
Brandeis), the “Indirect Utilitarianism” theory (which includes theo-
rists David Lyons, Thomas Emerson, and Frederick Schauer) and the 
“Democratic Functionalism” theory (which includes theorist Alex-
ander Meiklejohn); and (2) the “Deontological Liberal Theories” 
which include the “Lockean Liberalism” theory (which includes 
theorists John Locke, Hugo Black, and Chief Justice Burger), and 
the “Rawlsian Alternative” theory (which includes theorists John 
Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, and Ronald Dworkin).4 On the other hand, 
David A.J. Richards has identified the “Utilitarian Models” (which 
include John Stuart Mill and Oliver Wendell Holmes), the “Perfec-
tionist Models” (which include John Stuart Mill, Finnis, George, and 
Haksar), the “Argument from Democracy” theory (which includes 
John Hart Ely, Cass Sunstein, Owen Fiss, C. Edwin Baker, and Kent 
Greenawalt), and finally “The Toleration Model” (which Richards 
himself advocated).5 As one can see, each scholar has his own com-
plicated method of classifying each theory and theorist. Because legal 
reasoning rests upon free speech theory, a general treatment of pre-
vailing theories is in order. For the purposes of this Note, two gen-
eral groups of prevailing theories will be referred to as the utilitarian 
theory and the libertarian theory. 
 
 
 4. See D.F.B. TUCKER, LAW, LIBERALISM, AND FREE SPEECH 9-42 (1985). 
 5. David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy, the Principle of Free Speech, and the 
Politics of Identity, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 779, 788-803 (1999). 
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1. The utilitarian theory: Free speech as a tool to advance democracy 
and exchange ideas 
In Roth v. United States,6 Justice Brennan, writing for the Su-
preme Court, stated: “The protection given speech and press was 
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing 
about of political and social changes desired by the people.”7 Ac-
cordingly, speech is a utilitarian tool designed to promote democ-
racy. John Stuart Mill, one of the best known proponents of the 
utilitarian theory, also described how a community injury is avoided 
when each individual is able to express his opinions freely: “[T]he 
peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is 
robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing genera-
tion . . . .”8 Similarly, Walter Lippmann, the twentieth century pun-
dit, observed: “The right to speak freely is one of the necessary 
means to the attainment of the truth. That, and not the subjective 
pleasure of utterance, is why freedom is a necessity in the good soci-
ety.”9 Alexander Meiklejohn, Robert Bork, Cass Sunstein, and Tho-
mas Emerson have also advocated differing strands of utilitarian the-
ory in support of free speech.10 The utilitarian view that free speech 
preserves and perfects democratic institutions has had great impact 
on twentieth century jurisprudence.11 
2. The libertarian theory: Free speech as a protection of individual 
liberty and self-expression 
According to the libertarian theory, protection of speech is an 
end in itself, one that secures dignity to each individual by protecting 
his influence on society through expressive means. In Cohen v. Cali-
fornia,12 Justice Harlan wrote: 
 
 6. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
 7. Id. at 484. 
 8. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND UTILITARIANISM, 19 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 
1992) (1859). 
 9. WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY, reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL 
LIPPMANN at 193 (Clinton Rossiter & James Lare eds., Random House 1963). 
 10. See THE FIRST AMENDMENT 10–13 (Geoffrey R. Stone et. al. eds., 1999). 
 11. See John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First 
Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49 (1996). McGinnis states, “the perfection of collective 
democratic processes was the most important rationale for the expansion of free speech during 
[the last fifty years]. . . .” Id. at 51. 
 12. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
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The constitutional right of free expression . . . put[s] the decision 
as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, 
in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a 
more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief 
that no other approach would comport with the premise of indi-
vidual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.13 
Similarly, John O. McGinnis, a professor at Cardozo Law 
School, relied on James Madison and John Locke in support of an 
interesting property-based view of freedom of speech: 
Madison states that “[g]overnment is instituted to protect property 
of every sort,” including, in Madison’s view, man’s property in his 
“opinions and the free communication of them.” Thus, according 
to the first principles of the father of the Bill of Rights, free speech 
is not simply or even principally a means for sustaining a particular 
form of government; to the contrary, protecting free speech and 
other property rights is the end for which government is consti-
tuted. 
 . . . . 
 . . . The only legitimate Lockean restrictions on the transmission 
of information per se are those designed to prevent information 
from being used to deprive others of their life or property by force 
or fraud.14 
Finally, David A.J. Richards stated: 
[T]he significance of free expression rests on the central human ca-
pacity to create and express symbolic systems, such as speech, writ-
ing, pictures, and music. . . . Freedom of expression permits and 
encourages the exercise of these capacities: it supports a mature in-
dividual’s sovereign autonomy in deciding how to communicate 
with others . . . . In so doing, it nurtures and sustains the self-
respect of the mature person. 
 . . . . 
 
 
 13. Id. at 24. 
 14. McGinnis, supra note 11, at 68, 86 (quoting James Madison, Property, NAT’L 
GAZETTE (Mar. 27, 1792) reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266-68 (Robert 
A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983)). 
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The value of free expression, in this view, rests on its deep relation 
to self-respect arising from autonomous self-determination without 
which the life of the spirit is meager and slavish.15 
These sources persuasively argue that individual expression is not 
protected because it is useful to society but because self-expression is 
essential to the good life. Even though the libertarian and utilitarian 
theories caution against curtailing individual expression, the Supreme 
Court has limited freedom of speech in several instances. 
B. Judicial Limits on Freedom of Speech 
Freedom of speech controversies represent the classic conflict be-
tween the minority and majority. Typically, the majority passes a law 
restricting what the minority believes is its right to expression. The 
courts, often regarded as guardians of minority rights, frequently in-
validate the will of the majority because it infringes on the minority’s 
freedom of speech. An example of great protection of an individual’s 
right to speak is New York Times v. Sullivan,16 where the Supreme 
Court held that individuals could legally express opinions about pub-
lic figures that would normally be illegal under state defamation laws. 
At the same time, the courts have not endorsed an absolute right to 
expression. There are several instances where the judiciary, sensitive 
to majority mores, has refused to protect what the minority argues is 
its right to expression. 
In cases involving “fighting words” and obscenity the courts 
have held that the minority does not have a right to expression. The 
Supreme Court has determined that “‘fighting’ words . . . are no es-
sential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from 
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and moral-
ity.”17 Similarly, in Miller v. California the Supreme Court held that 
“obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.”18 The 
Court presented a test to determine obscenity: 
 
 15. David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the 
First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974). 
 16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court held that a public official cannot prevail on a 
defamation action unless the defamatory material was published with actual malice. See id. at 
279-80. Thus, speech targeting public officials is more protected than other speech which is 
subject to traditional defamation principles. 
 17. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 18. 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (citations omitted). 
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The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the 
“average person, applying contemporary community standards” 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient 
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently of-
fensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable 
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.19 
As one can observe, these are situations where the judiciary is 
sensitive to the majority will and limits the ability of individuals and 
minorities to speak freely. 
One area of Supreme Court case law has particular relevance to 
encryption source code. This line of precedent is often referred to as 
the “‘speech-conduct’ distinction” or the “expression-action dichot-
omy.”20 In O’Brien v. United States, the Supreme Court stated: “We 
cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct 
can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the con-
duct intends thereby to express an idea.”21 Under this reasoning, ac-
tivity must reach a certain level of expressiveness before it will qualify 
as speech for First Amendment purposes. The Court reinforced this 
point in City of Dallas v. Stanglin when it stated: “It is possible to 
find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person un-
dertakes—for example, walking down the street or meeting one’s 
friends at the shopping mall—but such a kernel is not sufficient to 
bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment.”22 
Under the Court’s analysis, activity peppered with elements of ex-
pression must reach a certain level of expressiveness before that activ-
ity will qualify for free speech protection. In another “speech-
conduct” case, Spence v. Washington, the Court found the activity at 
issue expressive enough to qualify as speech because it evinced “[a]n 
intent to convey a particularized message . . ., and in the surround-
ing circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would 
be understood by those who viewed it.”23 
Several principles emerge from the “speech-conduct” precedents. 
In order to qualify as speech: (1) there must be more than the actor’s 
 
 19. Id. at 24 (citations omitted). 
 20. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 209 (2nd ed. 
1996). 
 21. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 22. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). 
 23. 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974). 
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mere intent to communicate an idea;24 (2) the activity must contain 
more than a “kernel of expression;”25 and (3) the likelihood must be 
great that those who experience the message will understand it.26 
C. Pre-Bernstein Decisions 
As one readily observes, different types of speech receive different 
levels of protection. On a more fundamental level, if an activity is not 
sufficiently expressive, the government can regulate that activity 
without violating free speech rights. Recent technological advances 
have forced courts to determine if encryption software is expression 
meriting free speech protection or if it is activity that is not expres-
sive enough to qualify as speech. 
The exportation of encryption source code has been subject to 
some form of licensing regulation since 1977.27 The primary purpose 
of these licensing regulations has been to protect national security 
interests by withholding encryption technology from organized 
crime, espionage rings, and terrorists. The first case to address the 
issue of whether encryption licensing regulations violated free speech 
protections was Karn v. United States Department of State, 28 decided 
in March of 1996. 
1. Karn v. United States Department of State 
Bruce Schneier authored a book on cryptography, which was 
sold with an accompanying diskette, both of which contained an en-
cryption source code. Philip Karn was interested in making money by 
exporting these items and wanted to know whether he would need 
an export license under the relevant International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR).29 After Karn petitioned, the State Department 
concluded that the book was not subject to ITAR but the diskette 
was. Karn appealed this determination to the Assistant Secretary of 
State for Political Military Affairs, Thomas McNamara.30 McNamara 
 
 24. See O’Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 25. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). 
 26. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974). 
 27. For a detailed history of the encryption exportation regulations, see Ryan Alan 
Murr, Comment, Privacy and Encryption in Cyberspace: First Amendment Challenges to ITAR, 
EAR and Their Successors, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1401, 1413-20 (1997). 
 28. 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996). 
 29. See id. at 3-4. 
 30. See id. at 4. 
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also concluded that because the diskette contained encryption soft-
ware it was a “defense article” according to the United States Muni-
tions List.31 Karn brought an action in the District Court for Wash-
ington D.C. alleging, among other things, that regulation of the 
diskette violated his free speech rights.32 
According to the decision, Karn claimed the diskette was speech 
because it “contain[ed] ‘comments’ interspersed throughout the 
source code which are useful only to a human and are ignored by the 
computer, and because the source code and comments taken to-
gether teach humans how to speak in code.”33 In addressing Karn’s 
free speech claim, the court simply assumed the diskette was speech 
within the meaning of the First Amendment.34 Even with this gener-
ous assumption, the court upheld the constitutionality of ITAR un-
der the O’Brien test because it believed the regulations were content 
neutral, were within the constitutional powers of the government, 
and were narrowly tailored to an important and substantial govern-
ment interest.35 Moreover, the court held that Karn improperly re-
quested the court to decide encryption policy—an issue more appro-
priately resolved by Congress and the President.36 Because the Karn 
court simply assumed encryption source code was speech, the re-
mainder of the court’s analysis is not essential to this Note. How-
ever, Junger v. Daley,37 the only other pre-Bernstein case to address 
the issue, is much more thorough in its analysis than the Karn deci-
sion. 
2. Junger v. Daley 
Peter Junger, a law professor teaching a computer course at Case 
Western Reserve University Law School, maintained a website to 
which he posted class information and other items of interest to 
him.38 Junger wanted to post to his website encryption source code 
 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. at 3. 
 33. Id. at 9. 
 34. See id. (“[T]he Court will assume that the protection of the First Amendment ex-
tends to the source code and the comments on the plaintiff’s diskette.” (citations omitted)). 
 35. See id. at 10-12. 
 36. See id. at 3. (“This is a ‘political question’ for the two elected branches under Arti-
cles I and II of the Constitution.”). 
 37. 8 F. Supp.2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998). 
 38. See id. at 713. 
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that he had developed and requested that the Commerce Depart-
ment determine whether or not such a posting would require a li-
cense under ITAR.39 Because under ITAR “almost any posting of 
software on the Internet is an export,”40 the Commerce Department 
determined, on July 4, 1997, that Junger would need a license.41 
Junger brought an action claiming the licensing scheme was an inva-
lid prior restraint on his right to speak freely.42 
The court rejected Junger’s arguments and granted the govern-
ment’s summary judgment motion. In reaching this result, the 
Junger court set up a standard that differentiated between expressive 
and functional activity.43 In other words, activity with communicative 
purposes and characteristics should be protected as speech, but activ-
ity intended to perform some nonexpressive function should not be 
protected. The “most important issue,” as the court saw it, was 
“whether the export of encryption software source code is suffi-
ciently expressive to merit First Amendment protection.”44 The court 
did not provide a clear definition of what activity qualified as “suffi-
ciently expressive.” However, it did determine that “inherently ex-
pressive. . . . software contains an ‘exposition of ideas,’”45 which 
would presumably qualify as sufficiently expressive for free speech 
protection. At the same time, the court indicated that “inherently 
functional” software would not meet the sufficiently expressive stan-
dard.46 The court held that encryption source code was “inherently 
functional” and its exportation was not protected by the First 
Amendment.47 
Of great importance to the court was the purpose behind free 
speech protection—the preservation of the political process. “The 
protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people.”48 But not all human activity can be 
 
 39. See id. at 714. 
 40. Id. at 713. 
 41. See id at 714. 
 42. See id at 711. 
 43. See id at 714. 
 44. Id. at 715. 
 45. Id. at 716. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. at 715. 
 48. Id. at 715-16 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
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protected under the First Amendment: “[S]peech that is ‘so far re-
moved from any exposition of ideas, and from truth, science, moral-
ity, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the 
administration of Government’ lacks First Amendment protection.”49 
Based on these principles, the court reasoned that encryption source 
code “carries out the function of encryption” rather than “merely 
explain[ing] a cryptographic theory or describ[ing] how the software 
functions.”50 The court did admit that “encryption source code may 
occasionally be expressive,” but “[f]or the broad majority of per-
sons . . ., the value comes from the function the source code does.”51 
Because it is “inherently functional” and not “inherently expressive” 
from the viewpoint of a “majority of persons,” the court held that 
encryption source code did not merit First Amendment protection. 
The Bernstein case is the only circuit court decision to address 
free speech protection for encryption source code. The decision is 
the result of a legal contest that has produced four published opin-
ions,52 is presently under en banc review, and will likely be heard by 
the Supreme Court. In each of the published opinions, the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California and the 
Ninth Circuit have held encryption source code to be speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 
 
 49. Id. at 716 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 715, 716. 
 52. See Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997) 
[hereinafter Bernstein III]; Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279 
(N.D. Cal. 1996) [hereinafter Bernstein II]; and Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of State, 922 
F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996) [hereinafter Bernstein I]. In Bernstein I the court denied the 
government’s motion to dismiss for lack of justiciability. In so holding, the court determined 
that encryption source code was protected speech. See Bernstein I, 922 F. Supp. at 1432, 
1436. In Bernstein II the court granted Bernstein’s motion for summary judgment and con-
cluded that ITAR was unconstitutional on its face as applied to Bernstein. See Bernstein II, 945 
F. Supp. at 1290, 1296. In Bernstein III the court basically issued the same judgment as in 
Bernstein II in response to an executive order that changed the ITAR scheme to Export Ad-
ministration Regulations (EAR) which were also held invalid. See Bernstein III, 974 F. Supp. at 
1308. The fourth published decision is authored by the Ninth Circuit and is the principal opin-
ion discussed in this Note. 
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III. BERNSTEIN V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE53 
A. The Facts 
As a graduate student at University of California at Berkeley, 
Daniel Bernstein developed an encryption program he called “Snuf-
fle.”54 Like other encryption programs, Snuffle was capable of scram-
bling and unscrambling information so that only certain parties 
could understand the information. Bernstein wished to post Snuffle 
in source code form to the Internet in order to share his program 
with the scientific community.55 Upon Bernstein’s inquiry, the State 
Department determined he would need a license to “export” the en-
cryption program.56 “Exportation” under the relevant ITAR and Ex-
port Administration Regulations (EAR) provisions includes publish-
ing to the Internet.57 
Bernstein filed an action in the Northern District of California al-
leging, among other things, that the licensing regulations violated 
his First Amendment rights. As in Junger, the government argued 
that encryption source code was inherently functional and undeserv-
ing of free speech protection.58 The government also emphasized the 
national security interests furthered by ITAR and EAR: 
“[E]ncryption can be used to conceal communications of terrorists, 
drug smugglers, or others intent on taking hostile action against 
U.S. facilities, personnel, or security interests.”59 Despite the gov-
ernment’s arguments, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s 
ruling that Snuffle was protected speech within the meaning of the 
First Amendment and that the government’s licensing scheme was 
an unconstitutional prior restraint. 
 
 
 53. 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999). The Bernstein decision which is the subject of this 
Note was withdrawn for en banc review on September 30, 1999. See 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
 54. Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1136. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. at 1137. 
 58. See id. at 1142. 
 59. Id. at 1137 (quoting Lowell Decl. at 4, Appellant’s Excerpts of Record at 97). 
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B. The Court’s Reasoning 
The Bernstein court reached its determination that encryption 
source code is speech in three steps. First, the court emphasized the 
expressive characteristics of source code. Second, the court rejected a 
test that would deny First Amendment protection to speech that is 
both expressive and functional. Third, while the court did not openly 
admit its decision was result-oriented, it was arguably motivated by 
its disagreement with the policy underlying the encryption regula-
tions. 
In its first analytical step, the court emphasized the expressive 
characteristics of source code: “The distinguishing feature of source 
code is that it is meant to be read and understood by humans and 
that it can be used to express an idea or a method.”60 “It must be 
emphasized . . . that source code is merely text. . . .”61 While source 
code is only text, the court admitted that “only those trained in pro-
gramming can easily understand” the ideas and methods expressed.62 
The court accentuated the expressive elements of source code by 
limiting its analysis to the experience of Bernstein and other pro-
grammers. For Bernstein and other highly skilled programmers, 
source code is a medium that effectively communicates complex 
mathematical principles, much like economists’ and mathematicians’ 
use of graphs.63 Thus, in determining whether source code is expres-
sion, the court implicitly excluded the “untutored layperson” who 
would use Bernstein’s program without ever understanding its ex-
pressive elements.64 After all, “[i]t is Bernstein’s right to speak, not 
the rights of foreign listeners to hear, that we are concerned with 
here.”65 
In contrast, the government emphasized source code’s functional 
properties: “[Source code] can be used to control directly the opera-
tion of a computer without conveying information to the user.”66 
The court countered this argument by distinguishing source code 
from object code. Source code, written in computer languages such 
 
 60. Id. at 1140. 
 61. Id. at 1140 n.11. 
 62. See id. at 1140. 
 63. See id. at 1141. 
 64. See id. at 1140. 
 65. Id. at 1139 n.9. 
 66. Id. at 1142. 
HANS-FIN.DOC 5/20/00  11:15 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
676 
as Cobalt or C+, cannot operate a computer until converted to ob-
ject code. A computer program, known as a compiler, translates 
source code into object code, which is a series of ones and zeroes ar-
ranged so they represent the same computer commands contained in 
the source code. The court stated that “ignoring the distinction be-
tween source and object code obscures the important fact that 
source code is not meant solely for the computer, but is rather writ-
ten in a language intended also for human analysis and understand-
ing.”67 By emphasizing the differences between source and object 
code and limiting its analysis to programmers, the court found en-
cryption source code sufficiently expressive to merit First Amend-
ment protection. 
In the second stage of its reasoning, the court criticized “the 
government’s argument . . . [which] suggests that even one drop of 
‘direct functionality’ overwhelms any constitutional protections that 
expression might otherwise enjoy. This cannot be so.”68 It is proper 
to reject the “one drop of direct functionality” test, but the court 
does not indicate what degree of functionality, if any, will disqualify 
an activity from First Amendment protection. The court simply 
stated: “[W]e reject the notion that the admixture of functionality 
necessarily puts expression beyond the protections of the Constitu-
tion.”69 Thus, the court implied that if an activity has only minimal 
expressive elements it may still enjoy First Amendment protection. 
Interestingly, the Bernstein majority does not mention Junger or ad-
dress the inherently functional/expressive test set forth in Junger. 
The Bernstein dissent, however, relies extensively on Junger.70 
The third element of the court’s analysis was its zealous dis-
agreement with the policy judgments behind encryption controls: 
the “government is intentionally retarding the progress of the flour-
ishing science of cryptography.”71 After citing numerous examples of 
society’s reliance on electronic information storage and communica-
tion, the court declared: 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. at 1149 (Nelson, J. dissenting) (“The Junger decision thus adds considerable 
support for the propositions that encryption source code cannot be categorized as pure speech 
and that the functional aspects of encryption source code cannot be easily ignored or put 
aside.”). 
 71. Id. at 1145. 
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Whether we are surveilled by our government, by criminals, or by 
our neighbors. . . never has our ability to shield our affairs from 
prying eyes been at such a low ebb. The availability and use of se-
cure encryption may offer an opportunity to reclaim some portion 
of the privacy we have lost. . . . [I]t is important to point out that 
Bernstein’s is a suit not merely concerning a small group of scien-
tists laboring in an esoteric field, but also touches on the public in-
terest broadly defined.72 
By referring to the right to privacy, “the public interest broadly 
defined,” and benefits of encryption technology, the court seemed to 
be motivated by more than just free speech concerns. Unfortunately, 
the Bernstein court does not address the determination made in 
Junger that ITAR and EAR licensing provisions were political ques-
tions that did not implicate freedom of speech and, therefore, were 
not justiciable. Arguably, the Bernstein court used Bernstein’s case to 
overrule Executive and Congressional policy and better serve “the 
public interest broadly defined.” 
IV. ANALYSIS 
As explained in Part III.C, the Bernstein court reached its con-
clusion in three basic steps. Part IV.A pinpoints errors in the court’s 
reasoning, concluding that the court should have (1) relied on 
O’Brien v. United States and Spence v. Washington and analyzed 
Bernstein’s source code from the viewpoint of all affected parties, (2) 
relied on City of Dallas v. Stanglin and determined whether Bern-
stein’s encryption source code represented more than a “kernel of 
expression,” and (3) exercised judicial restraint by deferring to policy 
determined by the political process. Part IV.B argues that Supreme 
Court cases and the utilitarian and libertarian theories support First 
Amendment protection for technological speech, but not absolute 
protection for all technological activity. Part IV.C argues that the 
Bernstein analysis is too broad in its protection of technological activ-
ity. Finally, Part IV.D presents a factored test distinguishing between 
protected expressive technological activity and unprotected func-
tional technological activity. 
 
 72. Id. at 1146 (citations omitted). 
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A. Errors in the Court’s Reasoning 
1. The court ignored O’Brien and Spence by analyzing source code 
from the subjective viewpoint of Bernstein and other programmers 
The Bernstein court’s first error is that it analyzed source code 
solely from the perspective of Bernstein and other highly-skilled pro-
grammers. The Bernstein court’s approach is flawed because it ig-
nores the perspective of the majority of those affected by Bernstein’s 
program. The court stated, “It is Bernstein’s right to speak, not the 
rights of foreign listeners to hear, that we are concerned with 
here.”73 It is difficult to find meaningful limits in this subjective 
analysis, for rarely will an individual view an activity for which he is 
seeking First Amendment protection as nonexpressive. As the Su-
preme Court stated in O’Brien: “We cannot accept the view that an 
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ when-
ever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express 
an idea.”74 
While the Bernstein court did not use a purely subjective analysis 
(the court at least required that other programmers be able to under-
stand the expressive elements of the source code), it still ignored 
Spence v. Washington. In that case the Supreme Court stated that in 
order for conduct mixed with elements of expression to receive first 
amendment protection, “the likelihood [must be] great that the 
message would be understood by those who viewed it.”75 Unfortu-
nately, the Bernstein court did not apply this principle. 
In Bernstein, those who had access to Bernstein’s encryption 
source code were Internet users who would download the program. 
For these people, the program would have no purpose other than 
performing its intended function—to encrypt. Even for programmers 
who understand the logarithmic ideas incorporated into source code, 
the source code experience is partly expressive and partly functional. 
By analyzing it from the perspective of all those who experience it, 
source code has an overwhelmingly functional purpose. If the Bern-
stein court addressed the principles in O’Brien and Spence, it is likely 
the encryption source code would not qualify as speech. 
 
 73. Id. at 1139 n.9. 
 74. O’Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 75. 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974). 
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2. The court ignored Stanglin by protecting an activity that society 
would view as having only a kernel of expression 
In City of Dallas v. Stanglin, the Supreme Court stated that “[i]t 
is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a 
person undertakes—for example, walking down the street or meeting 
one’s friends at the shopping mall—but such a kernel is not sufficient 
to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amend-
ment.”76 Despite this principle, the Bernstein court seems to have ex-
tended free speech protection to an activity that society views as hav-
ing only a kernel of expression. Because the court did not require 
that the encryption program be primarily expressive to be protected, 
the court’s holding myopically provided free speech protection to 
only partly expressive activity. In doing so, the court contradicted 
Stanglin. 
Because humans are creatures of will, there is no human activity 
that does not contain some measure of expression. Recognizing the 
potential danger of its analysis, the Bernstein court tried to “empha-
size the narrowness of [its] First Amendment holding” by stating it 
“do[es] not hold that all software is expressive.”77 But under the 
court’s analysis, there does not seem to be any human-produced 
software that cannot communicate some mathematical or methodo-
logical idea to another programmer. Thus, the purported narrowness 
of the court’s holding is illusory. 
3. The court should have exercised judicial restraint and deferred to 
political determinations of policy 
The Bernstein court’s views on encryption policy are superior to 
those reflected in the encryption regulations at issue. ITAR and EAR 
unwisely discourage the development of valuable encryption tech-
nology because they remove profits earned by exporting the tech-
nology. In a world becoming exponentially more dependent on 
computers, encryption technology has never been needed more. 
As one computer security specialist has said: “There is no such 
thing as security, only precaution.”78 Thus, the purpose of computer 
 
 76. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). 
 77. Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 78. Telephone interview with Alan Wyble, computer security systems specialist (Sept. 2, 
1999). 
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security is simply to make it too time consuming and expensive for a 
hacker to break in. With sensitive and extremely valuable information 
available at financial institutions, medical centers, law enforcement 
facilities, military bases, and businesses, the need for more advanced 
precautionary tools is evident. There have even been reports of mili-
tary schools specializing in computer warfare.79 And the United 
States Office of the Comptroller of Currency recently issued a bulle-
tin warning of “the threats and vulnerabilities created by cyber-
terrorism to the financial services industry.”80 
The above are powerful arguments that government should re-
frain from hindering encryption technology; however, the Bernstein 
court irresponsibly used its judicial role as impartial arbiter to imple-
ment its own encryption policy. In reaching its holding, the Bern-
stein court relied in part on “an opportunity to reclaim some portion 
of the privacy we have lost.”81 It seems irresponsible for the Bernstein 
court to rely on the right to privacy in determining that encryption 
source code is protected speech. 
The Karn court saw the free speech argument for what it was: 
The plaintiff, in an effort to export a computer diskette for profit, 
raises . . . meritless constitutional claims because he and others have 
not been able to persuade the Congress and the Executive Branch 
that the technology at issue does not endanger the national secu-
rity. This is a “political question” for the two elected branches un-
der Articles I and II of the Constitution.82 
Unlike the Karn court, the Bernstein court concluded differently  
because it disagreed with the policy behind encryption regulations 
and substituted its judgment for that of Congress and the presi-
dent.83 
 
 79. Computer Security in China, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP. (International Executive 
Reports, Ltd.), July 15, 1998. The article cites the China Defense News of October 16, 1998, 
where Shen Weiguang, the “Chinese ‘information war’ expert,” notes the rise of information 
war specialties in military schools. Id. 
 80. Cybercrimes: Infrastructure Threats from Cyber-terrorists, CYBERSPACE LAW., Apr. 
1999, at 23. Clifford A. Wilke, Office of Comptroller of the Currency director of Bank Tech-
nology Division, issued the bulletin on March 5, 1999. The bulletin continued, “OCC’s con-
cern is with how rapidly the threats from terrorists and criminals are evolving in terms of tech-
nology, and our banks’ ability to develop and implement adequate preventative controls and 
countermeasures.” Id. 
 81. Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1146 (citations omitted). 
 82. Karn v. United States Dep’t of State, 925 F. Supp 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 1996). 
 83. Karn is not distinguishable from Bernstein on the basis of profit seeking. While 
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B. Technological Speech 
As we have seen, all forms of communication are not created 
equal. For example, opinions regarding public figures receive great 
constitutional protection.84 On the other hand, conduct which is not 
pure speech but has expressive elements enjoys less constitutional 
protection,85 and obscene materials are not protected at all.86 In this 
speech protection hierarchy, one wonders what protection techno-
logical activity should receive. In order to understand why the Bern-
stein court applied an inappropriate level of protection to techno-
logical activity, we must explore Supreme Court precedent and the 
theories supporting free speech. 
1. The Supreme Court would probably protect technological speech 
under the First Amendment 
There is little case law on technological speech. Allen M. Shinn, 
Jr., a senior official at the National Science Foundation, stated: “The 
Supreme Court has not decided whether scientific speech is pro-
tected under the First Amendment.”87 However, the Supreme Court 
has recognized the value of scientific speech in various settings. For 
example, in the obscenity cases, material that “the ‘average person, 
applying contemporary community standards’ would find . . . appeals 
to the prurient interest . . . and [is] patently offensive” is still pro-
tected under the First Amendment if it does not “lack[] serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”88 In other words, even ob-
scene material will be protected if it has serious scientific value. By 
placing scientific speech on the same footing as literary, artistic, and 
 
there is no evidence Bernstein wanted to charge money to those who accessed his website, the 
success of Bernstein as a scientist and programmer largely turns on his reputation and quality 
of work. One cannot seriously contend that Bernstein did not have a professional, and, there-
fore pecuniary, interest in publishing his work to the Internet. 
 84. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court held that a public 
official cannot prevail on a defamation action unless the defamatory material was published 
with actual malice. See id. at 279-80. Thus, speech targeting public officials is more protected 
than other speech which is subject to traditional defamation principles. 
 85. See; City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418 
U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974); O’Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 86. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
 87. Allen M. Shinn, Jr., The First Amendment and the Export Laws: Free Speech on Scien-
tific and Technical Matters, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 368, 378 (1990). 
 88. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted). 
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political speech, it seems likely that the Supreme Court would pro-
tect technological speech. 
2. The theories of free speech purposes also support protecting 
technological speech 
The underlying theories of free speech also support protection of 
technological communications. Under the utilitarian theory, one 
need only observe the standard of living modern technology has pro-
vided to conclude that the theory would protect technological 
speech. A strong argument can be made even under the democratic 
process strain of the utilitarian theory that technological speech 
should be protected because it is a democratizing force. For example, 
a common saying on the American western frontier was: “God cre-
ated men; Colonel Colt made them equal.”89 One instinctively de-
tects the democratizing force of Colt’s six-shooter, also known as the 
“Equalizer.” Similarly, Roger Burlingame, has argued that inventors 
such as Whitney, Fulton, and McCormick provided the social cohe-
sion that made possible the union envisioned by Lincoln and Web-
ster.90 As James Ferguson has argued: “It seems clear . . . that the so-
cial value of technological expression is so substantial that this 
category of speech cannot be viewed as warranting less protection 
than other forms of expression.”91 
The libertarian theory would also support protection of techno-
logical speech. As Ferguson also argued, a libertarian theory of “free 
expression clearly applies to scientific communications because they 
represent the final product in a creative intellectual process. . . . The 
personal satisfaction arising from such creative intellectual work ac-
counts for much of the scientist’s interest in a system of free scientific 
expression.”92 Similarly, in The Existential Pleasures of Engineering, 
Samuel Florman wrote: “The beauty of the machine is pure, like 
mathematics. It is also, paradoxically, imbued with the vitality of 
humanity, since it is exclusively man-made.”93 Likewise, the great ar-
 
 89. WILLIAM HOSLEY, COLT: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN LEGEND 66 (1996). 
 90. See ROGER BURLINGAME, THE MARCH OF THE IRON MEN: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
UNION THROUGH INVENTION 421-36 (1938). 
 91. James R. Ferguson, Scientific and Technological Expression: A Problem in First 
Amendment Theory, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519, 546-47 (1981). 
 92. Id. at 533, 535. 
 93. SAMUEL C. FLORMAN, THE EXISTENTIAL PLEASURES OF ENGINEERING 135 
(1994). 
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chitect Louis Sullivan wrote: “With me. . . architecture is not an art, 
but a religion, and that religion but a part of the greater religion of 
Democracy.”94 A libertarian theorist will not seriously question the 
right of a scientist to express himself under the protection of the 
First Amendment. 
3. The need for limits on technological activity 
Despite these convincing arguments, protection for technological 
speech must not be absolute. Under the current free speech para-
digm, government can only regulate political speech if it has a “com-
pelling state interest.”95 On the other hand, under O’Brien the gov-
ernment can regulate activity that is not speech if it seeks to further 
“an important or substantial interest.”96 Because technological activ-
ity would receive far greater protection from government regulation 
if it were speech than if it were not speech, a court must be able to 
distinguish technological speech from technological activity that is 
not speech. For example, if all technological ideas, conduct, and de-
vices were protected speech, the government would be greatly re-
stricted in its ability to impose safety regulations in the auto industry, 
precautionary measures on human cloning, safety and export con-
trols on arms, zoning regulations on architecture, and safety meas-
ures regulating chemicals and drugs. 
Free speech protection exists to protect ideas, not conduct or ob-
jects. Because government must be able to regulate conduct and ob-
jects to provide safety and order, a court must be able to distinguish 
technological conduct and objects from technological expression. 
Supreme Court precedent in the “speech-conduct” line supply prin-
ciples that will help courts distinguish technological speech from 
technological conduct and objects. The principles that emerge from 
the “speech-conduct” cases are: (1) an actor’s mere intent to com-
municate an idea cannot transform activity into speech;97 (2) the ac-
tivity must contain more than a “kernel of expression;”98 and (3) the 
likelihood that those who experience the message will understand it 
 
 94. JOHN A. KOUWENHOVEN, MADE IN AMERICA 95 (1948) (quoting Louis Sullivan). 
 95. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1987) (citations omitted). 
 96. O’Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 97. See id. at 376. 
 98. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). 
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must be great.99 Some libertarian theorists severely criticize the 
“speech-conduct” approach because it limits an individual’s auton-
omy and expression. 
a. Libertarian considerations. Commenting on the O’Brien case, 
which held that burning a draft card was not protected speech, Ste-
ven H. Shiffrin stated, “O’Brien is perhaps the ultimate first amend-
ment insult. O’Brien is jailed because the authorities find his manner 
of expression unpatriotic, threatening, and offensive. When he com-
plains that his freedom of speech has been abridged, the authorities 
deny that he has spoken.”100 Shiffrin raises an important issue: What 
constitutes expression and who defines it? For Shiffrin, it seems that 
the individual should be the ultimate judge of what qualifies as ex-
pression. However, this must not be so. If it were, an individual 
could remove his conduct from all laws based on “substantial” inter-
ests simply by alleging that his conduct is expressive (only laws based 
on a “compelling” government interest would still apply). Even 
though some extreme libertarian theorists would support protection 
of all activity an actor subjectively views as expressive, such a system 
would ultimately jeopardize individual liberty. 
According to classical liberalism and social contract theory, a sys-
tem where each individual delivers a portion of his sovereignty to the 
state maximizes individual liberty.101 When individuals choose con-
vention (or law) over unrestrained exercise of individual will (or an-
archy), the resultant predictability engenders greater liberty. In this 
fundamental sense, the individual is dependent on the whole for lib-
 
 99. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974). 
 100. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 81 
(1990). 
 101. Plato describes an ideal state where “each [person] would be his own best guard-
ian.” PLATO, REPUBLIC 42 (G.M.A. Grube trans., C.D.C. Reeve rev., Hackett Publishing 2d 
ed. 1992) (ca. 380 B.C.). However, he recognizes that those who “lack power to . . . avoid 
suffering [injustice] decide that it is profitable to come to an agreement with each other nei-
ther to do injustice nor to suffer it. As a result, they begin to make laws and covenants.” Id. 
John Locke also describes the social contract: 
Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can 
be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his 
own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty 
and puts on the bonds of civil society is by agreeing with other men to join and 
unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one 
amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties and a greater security 
against any that are not of it. 
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 54 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Liberal 
Arts Press 1952) (1690). 
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erty. Because the individual derives liberty through submission to so-
ciety’s rules, a system of unrestricted behavior would be hostile to 
individual freedom. If law could not govern individual behavior, the 
strong would prey on the weak and society would move closer to a 
violent Hobbesian state of nature where the “life of man [is] solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”102 While the libertarian theory gives 
great deference to self-expression and individual pursuit of con-
science, individual freedom to speak can only survive if it is sensitive 
in some degree to society’s definition of speech. If the established 
principles of the “speech-conduct” cases are applied to technological 
activity, individuals will enjoy greater technological self-expression 
than they would in the chaotic condition that would result if gov-
ernment could only regulate conduct for “compelling” purposes. 
Like an irrigation canal without any banks, individual expression 
cannot exist unless minimally channeled. 
b. Utilitarian considerations. The utilitarian theory would reject 
any free speech standard that diminishes the utility of technological 
speech. A system that protects technological objects and conduct 
that society does not view as speech will arguably diminish the utility 
of speech. 
Thomas Emerson, a utilitarian theorist, stated: “The guiding 
principle must be to determine which element is predominant in the 
conduct under consideration. Is expression the major element . . . 
[o]r is the action the essence?. . . The answer, to a great extent, must 
be based on a common-sense reaction. . . .”103 If the judiciary limits 
the majority’s ability to pass laws restricting technological conduct 
and objects to only those laws furthering “compelling” social inter-
ests, the judiciary may lose its institutional legitimacy.104 For exam-
ple, designers of automobiles and chemical engineers may claim that 
the technological objects they produce are protected expression. If 
the judiciary protects such activity as speech and only permits the 
government to impose regulations furthering a “compelling gov-
 
 102. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, OR THE MATTER, FORM, AND POWER OF A 
COMMONWEALTH, ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL in 3 THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS 
HOBBES OF MALMESBURY, at 113 (Sir William Molesworth, Bart. ed., 1966) (1651). 
 103. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 80 (1970). 
 104. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). One of 
the main reasons the Court did not overturn Roe v. Wade was its fear that the nation would 
not accept such a decision. The Court stated: “[T]he Court’s legitimacy depends on making 
legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is suffi-
ciently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.” Id. at 866. 
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ernment interest,” it is probable that many safety regulations based 
on “substantial interests” will be invalidated. In such cases, it is pos-
sible, if not likely, the executive branch will have the political support 
to simply ignore such a judicial mandate.105 In such circumstances, 
the court’s ability to protect speech would decrease, and the majority 
would be less able to benefit from speech once protected by an au-
thoritative judiciary. In essence, a court has the difficult task of pro-
tecting minority speech within limits the majority will tolerate. The 
court must be sensitive to social mores and choose its battles wisely. 
C. The Bernstein Court’s Standard Is Too Broad 
In order to qualify for free speech protection under the Bernstein 
court’s analysis, one must merely show that the technological expres-
sion “is meant to be . . . understood by humans and that it can be 
used to express an idea or a method.”106 Furthermore, it must not be 
understood by the entire audience, but only by those similarly situ-
ated (fellow programmers in Bernstein’s case). This test is too broad 
and undermines both the utilitarian and libertarian theories. 
Arguably, many other types of technological conduct and devices 
would also receive protection under the court’s analysis. For exam-
ple, architects are paid large sums of money to erect structures com-
municating ideas such as financial stability, moral responsibility, pro-
gress, innovation, chicness, cosmopolitanism, man’s dominion over 
nature, or simply eccentricity. Of course, architectural structures also 
have functional roles—providing space to live, work, and recreate. At 
the same time, an architectural product is expressive, and arguably 
much more so than source code. Far more people can understand 
the ideas captured in Shreve, Lamb, and Harmon’s Empire State 
Building or John Strauss’ Golden Gate Bridge than can understand 
the ideas expressed in source code. Similar to source code, architec-
ture reveals scientific ideas, mathematical truths, and methodological 
views to other architects. Furthermore, architectural works are more 
expressive than source code—they are mythic symbols communicat-
ing deep meaning to society at large. 
 
 105. In case this scenario seems implausible. The reader will recall that the Supreme 
Court suffered severe criticism when it invalidated many New Deal programs. Franklin Roose-
velt’s court packing proposal and the “switch in time” are evidence that a powerful political 
majority does have the ability to undermine positions the Court takes. 
 106. Bernstein v. United States Dep’t. of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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The Bernstein court’s analysis would also arguably protect the 
manufacture of firearms, automobiles, chemicals, drugs, and every 
other technological undertaking that would communicate ideas or 
methods to specialized technicians. The Bernstein court’s subjective 
approach gives rise to the same utilitarian and libertarian critiques of 
a purely subjective system described above.107  
D. Toward an Expressive/Functional Test 
An approach that would better preserve First Amendment privi-
leges and further its purposes is one that distinguishes between pro-
tected expressive activity and unprotected functional activity. The 
purpose of an expressive/functional test is to distinguish protected 
technological expression from unprotected technological conduct 
and devices. 
1. Proposed expressive/functional test 
The core element of this test is whether a reasonable person 
within the audience (those likely to actually encounter the activity) 
would view the activity as primarily functional or expressive. This test 
has roots in the “speech-conduct” cases already cited in this Note 
and incorporates three principles: (1) there must be more than the 
actor’s mere intent to communicate an idea;108 (2) the activity must 
contain more than a “kernel of expression;”109 and (3) the “likeli-
hood [must be] great that the message would be understood by 
those who viewed it.”110 If a reasonable person in the audience 
would view the activity as expressive, the court will proceed to tradi-
tional First Amendment analysis. If the activity would be viewed as 
primarily functional, it is not speech within the meaning of the First 
Amendment. 
This test will undoubtedly tax even the most capable jurist. Ad-
mittedly, all human activity contains functional and expressive ele-
ments. Even oral or written speech is partly functional and must be 
so in a physical world (sound waves create physical impressions on 
ear drums, and photons stimulate retinas). However, the law must 
recognize that a distinction between primarily functional and primar-
 
 107. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
 108. See O’Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 109. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). 
 110. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974). 
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ily expressive activity is not only necessary but also possible. Several 
factors are helpful in making this determination. 
The factors to be used in determining whether an activity is pri-
marily functional or expressive are: (1) the nature of the medium 
used, (2) the composition and scope of the audience, and (3) the ex-
tent to which physical objects involved in the activity represent an 
idea or reduce human labor. These factors are not weighted and 
serve merely as guidelines to the court. This approach is designed to 
offer the flexibility needed in the slippery realm of freedom of speech 
analysis and provide enough structure to discourage result-oriented 
decisions. Of course, a stubborn court will doubtlessly be able to en-
gage in result-oriented decision making, but this test will generally 
discourage such decisions. A deeper exploration of these factors will 
reveal the strengths, and perhaps the weaknesses, of this test. 
a. The nature of the medium. Choice of medium often affects the 
composition of an actor’s audience (for example, publishing to the 
Internet instead of e-mailing). A medium’s effect on the size and 
composition of an audience and, hence, an audience’s ability to un-
derstand a message is treated in the next section.111 The choice of 
medium also affects the expressive nature of a message.112 For exam-
ple, communication in a language both parties understand is more 
expressive than communication in a language neither party under-
stands well.113 Ceteris paribus, if an actor uses a medium that is less 
expressive than other media, an inference arises that the actor is more 
concerned with functional aspects of the activity in question.114 
For example, the Bernstein court points to “blueprints, recipes, 
and ‘how-to’ manuals” as expressive media with functional ele-
ments.115 If one wishes to communicate to another the process 
whereby one makes a car, a how-to manual will be more expressive 
than a finished automobile. In the latter instance, it will be presumed 
 
 111. See infra PartIV.C.1.b. 
 112. See generally MARSHALL MCLUHAN, THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE (1967). “So-
cieties have always been shaped more by the nature of the media by which men communicate 
than by the content of the communication.” Id. at 8. 
 113. See, e.g., infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 114. Ceteris paribus is a Latin term meaning “other things being equal.” WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 368 (1971). Admittedly, this is an argument simi-
lar to that made in the time, place, and manner context. Because this Note addresses the prob-
lem of how to define speech, and not what level of protection qualifying speech should receive, 
a thorough discussion of time, place, and manner principles is best left for another day. 
 115. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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that the party furnishing the finished automobile is more concerned 
with functional aspects of the automobile than communicating the 
process of making an automobile. 
b. The composition and scope of the audience. Actors generally have 
control over the scope and composition of their audience. Suppose 
an actor desires to communicate to a specific audience that will uni-
versally understand his message. If the actor uses a medium that in-
creases the size and alters the composition of the audience such that 
most of the audience does not understand the intended message, 
then there is an inference that the activity is primarily functional and 
not expressive. 
For example, an actor who publishes a computer program to the 
Internet in an attempt to make it available to programmers (for 
whom he also has e-mail addresses), is less concerned with speech 
than an actor who simply e-mails the program to his programmer 
friends. This factor helps determine the intent of the actor, but the 
audience’s perception of the activity is the chief concern. An actor’s 
intent to communicate cannot by itself transform an audience’s per-
ception of an activity from functional to expressive. An actor can in-
crease the availability of free speech protections by narrowing his au-
dience to those who will understand the message. 
c. The extent to which the object represents an idea or reduces 
physical human labor. Every expressive activity involves some physical 
object, such as paper, air molecules, or sound waves. However, the 
purpose of free speech is to protect ideas not objects. Objects are 
only protected to the extent they represent ideas or are immediately 
connected to the communication of ideas. For example, while paper 
does not generally represent ideas, it is essential to the expression of 
ideas in writing. Free speech principles would protect the use of pa-
per to the extent it is used to communicate ideas. However, if paper 
towels are used to mop up spilt milk, the paper is not being used to 
communicate ideas but to reduce the human labor needed to clean 
up spills. Of course, all technology reduces human labor to some ex-
tent, thereby theoretically giving individuals more time to think and 
exchange ideas. However, an object’s connection with expression 
must be close and immediate in order to be protected under free 
speech principles. What is more, minimal human involvement to fa-
cilitate the object’s purpose should not affect a determination of 
functionality or expressiveness. 
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For example, even though an automobile is not functional until a 
human starts it, turning a key in an ignition should not detract from 
an automobile’s functionality. Likewise, pressing a button to convert 
source code to object code should not significantly affect a determi-
nation of its expressiveness or functionality. At the same time, an ob-
ject’s ability to perform incidental work should not affect its expres-
sive nature. For example, Michelangelo’s statue of David should not 
be characterized as functional because it can be used as a bird perch. 
In each circumstance, the court should determine the most natural 
purpose of the object from the audience’s point of view. 
2. The expressive/functional test furthers the purposes of free speech 
As we have seen, the fundamental purpose of freedom of speech 
is to protect minority expression from possible oppression by the col-
lective strength of a majority. According to the two prevalent theo-
ries of free speech, minority speech should be protected as a means 
to preserve democracy and thus prevent the majority from harming 
itself (utilitarian theory), and because expression of one’s ideas is an 
end in itself (libertarian theory). Both theories require that courts 
fashion a standard of free speech that protects the minority’s ability 
to speak but also caution that extending speech protection too far 
ultimately jeopardizes freedom of speech. 
The expressive/functional test limits actions protected under 
freedom of speech within bounds society will tolerate, and by so do-
ing ensures the continued vitality of an individual’s right to express 
conscience. The test accomplishes this goal in two fundamental ways. 
First, the test separates functional activity from expressive activity 
(something the Bernstein court does not do) and thereby excludes 
nonspeech activity from protection. Secondly, the test provides a par-
tially objective standard in making the distinction between functional 
and expressive activity—the test employs the viewpoint of a reason-
able audience member. By employing a partially subjective standard 
(the viewpoint of a reasonable audience member instead of a reason-
able member of society), the expressive/functional test still protects 
the individual from oppressive majorities. With these two precautions 
in place, it is more likely the judiciary will protect its legitimacy in 
the eyes of the public and, therefore, preserve its power to enforce 
free speech principles. Furthermore, political processes will better re-
solve tension between segments of society, and a greater sense of 
community will engender greater individual liberty. By protecting 
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individual activity within limits the majority will tolerate, the expres-
sive/functional test successfully serves the dual purposes of speech 
protection. It remains to be seen how exportation of encryption 
source code over the Internet will hold up under this test. 
3. Application of the expressive/functional test to the facts in Bernstein 
The first factor is the actor’s choice of medium. The court em-
phasized the differences between source code and object code, 
pointing out that source code could not actually perform any func-
tion until compiled into object code.116 This is an insignificant dis-
tinction. The same argument could be made by stating that an 
automobile is more expressive than functional because one must turn 
the ignition key before it starts; thus only a running automobile is 
functional. Under this factor, it is clear that encryption source code is 
a medium with functional characteristics. It is also clear that source 
code is an expressive medium because programmers use it to express 
complex mathematical ideas to other programmers. Because the use 
of a functional medium creates a presumption that the actor is more 
concerned with function than with expression, the crucial determina-
tion is whether source code is the least functional medium by which 
Bernstein can convey his message. 
If Bernstein simply wished to express mathematical principles, he 
could surely do it on paper. By using source code, one purpose of 
which is to control a computer, Bernstein was doing more than sim-
ply conveying mathematical ideas. At the very least, he wanted to 
convey mathematical ideas in the context of encryption program-
ming. More likely, Bernstein wanted to promote encryption tech-
nology by providing an encryption program to other programmers 
and computer users. This indicates Bernstein’s purpose was not only 
to comment on encryption as an abstract academic problem but also 
to provide a device to be used in practical situations. In essence, 
Bernstein said: “Fellow programmers, here is a good encryption pro-
gram. What do you think?” The most effective, and perhaps only, 
way to communicate this message was to provide the actual program. 
Any other medium would not have the same effectiveness as being 
able to see the program actually work on a computer. Under this  
 
 
 116. See id. 
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factor, Bernstein probably could not have used a less functional me-
dium to convey the same message. 
The next factor is the scope and composition of the audience and 
its ability to understand the message. The majority of people access-
ing Bernstein’s program on the Internet would not understand its 
expressive elements. While it would be impossible (and perhaps an 
invasion of privacy) to know the identities of each Internet user ac-
cessing Bernstein’s site, it is likely the majority of the actual audience 
would be nonprogrammers interested in the functional use of Bern-
stein’s encryption program. Bernstein could have restricted his audi-
ence to programmers by providing access instructions on his Internet 
site only those who understood source code could follow. He also 
could have distributed the program by e-mail to those within his 
academic circle or solicited programmers’ e-mail addresses on his 
web site. Because Bernstein made the program available to an audi-
ence that he knew would, for the most part, only understand its 
function, this factor indicates that the program is primarily func-
tional. 
Finally, Bernstein’s encryption source code is a tool capable of 
performing the function of encryption. Bernstein’s program would 
greatly reduce the amount of human labor needed to encrypt. Such 
work is not incidental to any expressive purpose, thus indicating that 
the program is primarily functional. Furthermore, this interpretation 
of Bernstein’s program is not unnatural. 
After exploring these factors, it is likely that a reasonable member 
of the audience would view publishing encryption source code to the 
Internet as primarily functional. Therefore, Bernstein’s source code 
should not qualify as speech within the ambit of the First Amend-
ment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Bernstein court ignores important principles in Supreme 
Court “speech-conduct” precedents. It does so by redefining free 
speech protection to encompass any activity with only minor ele-
ments of expression. Because all human activity is imbued with ele-
ments of expression, the court’s free speech formulation will open a 
Pandora’s Box. Free speech claims will inundate the courts, but more 
importantly, the Bernstein decision endangers long-term free speech 
protection. Such a condition will ultimately discredit the courts and 
undermine the purposes of freedom of speech. 
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The expressive/functional test advanced in this Note is consis-
tent with the principles embodied in “speech-conduct” precedent 
because it bases the distinction between expression and function on 
the viewpoint of a reasonable member of the audience, not the sub-
jective view of the individual actor. By basing the distinction be-
tween functional and expressive activity on the views of the audience, 
rather than on the subjective views of the actor, the expres-
sive/functional test preserves social order while permitting individual 
liberty. Such a balance most adequately protects the freedom to 
voice one’s conscience in a democratic society. 
Seth Hanson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
